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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientations on 
negotiation outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Instability was created by 
pitting individualists against cooperators (mixed dyads), and by giving only one of the 
parties information about the other party’s orientation. A total of 162 subjects 
participated in negotiation simulations, where orientation and information were 
manipulated through instructions from management. The cooperative dyads got better 
outcomes than did the individualistic dyads. The mixed dyads did as well as the 
cooperative dyads when the cooperators had information, but did as badly as the 
individualistic dyads when the individualists had information. The process analyses 
indicated that the dyads with high outcomes achieved their results because the 
integrative activities increased over time. In the mixed dyads with informed 
individualists, the individualists reached higher individual outcome than their 
cooperative (uninformed) opponents. Thus, naive cooperators can easily be exploited. 
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Knowing Me, Knowing You: Own Orientation and  
Information about the Opponent’s Orientation in Negotiation 
Motivational orientation is a prime mover behind behavior and outcomes in 
negotiations, as it gives negotiators goals and directions (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). 
For example, individualists seek to maximize only their own outcomes while 
cooperators seek to maximize both their own and the joint outcomes. Previous 
research on motivational orientation has found cooperators to have more integrative 
behavior and to get better outcomes than individualists (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 
2000). Thus, motivational orientations seem to influence outcomes in predictable 
ways through the goal-directed behavior they trigger. These findings are, however, 
confined to stable negotiation contexts. Typically, homogeneous cooperative dyads 
are compared to homogeneous individualistic dyads. Furthermore, there is symmetry 
in information about the motivational orientation of the opponent, i.e., the negotiators 
both have, or have not, information about their counterpart. Based on previous 
research we therefore do not know what happen when the stability of the negotiation 
context is upset, e.g., when dyads are mixed rather than homogeneous, and when 
information is asymmetrical.  
Motivational orientations are different from, and more stable, than negotiation 
behavior (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). Negotiators may therefore vary their 
behavior, depending on the negotiation context, in their efforts to reach the goals 
implied by their motivational orientations. For example, in dyads with mix in 
motivational orientation, the negotiation dynamic and thereby outcomes, may depend 
on who has knowledge about the opponent’s orientation. Therefore, in this research 
we focus on how motivational orientations influence outcomes in unstable negotiation 
contexts. We do so by (1) introducing information asymmetries in knowledge about 
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the orientation of the other party, and by (2) pitting cooperative negotiators against 
individualists (mixed dyads). Furthermore, in addition to joint outcome, we include 
perceptual measures of negotiation quality. 
Extending research on motivational orientations into unstable negotiation 
contexts is highly relevant both for practice and theory. First, information asymmetry 
is a likely challenge for negotiators. Some negotiators may have information about 
their counterpart based on general reputation or from information given from 
individuals that have previously negotiated with the other party. Other negotiators 
may be completely unprepared for the orientation of the other party. Second, it is 
quite likely that a negotiator may meet an opponent with a different orientation, given 
the mixed-motive nature of the interaction (Brett, 1991). Finally, the perceived 
negotiation quality is important because it predicts willingness to implement 
agreements, and the climate in future negotiations (Brett & Rognes, 1986). From a 
theoretical perspective we need to know more about the relationships between 
motivational orientations, negotiation dynamic, and outcomes in unstable negotiation 
contexts. In their meta-analytical review, De Dreu et al. (2000) focused only on 
homogeneous dyads, but called for research on motivational orientation in less stable 
negotiation contexts. Presently we do not know whether the effects of motivational 
orientation are reduced in unstable negotiation contexts, or whether the effects depend 
on the nature of the instability.  
Orientation and Information 
Motivational orientation is an individual level variable that can be caused by 
stable individual differences (i.e., social value orientation), or be triggered by 
situational demands (i.e., motivational orientation). Research suggests that trait and 
state have similar effects on outcomes in homogeneous dyads (De Dreu et al., 2000). 
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In this study we focus on orientation as a state. We do so because most of the 
integrative negotiation literature we link up to (De Dreu et al., 2000) focuses on 
motivational orientation rather than social value orientation, and because of its 
potential practical relevance. Since negotiators often act on behalf of an organization, 
the mandate they receive from higher level management is of critical importance 
when they negotiate. We therefore used instructions from management to create the 
negotiators’ orientations in the present study (Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Also 
those receiving information about the opponent’s orientation, got this information 
from their management. Below, we first discuss how orientation and asymmetrical 
information affect the dyadic outcomes. Then we focus on the individual level to see 
how orientation and information affect the parties’ individual outcomes. 
Dyadic Outcomes 
Our first research concern is whether previously found differences between 
homogeneous cooperative and homogeneous individualistic dyads also hold up when 
information asymmetry is introduced. The results will also give us a baseline for the 
comparisons with mixed dyads with asymmetric information. That cooperative dyads 
typically reach higher joint outcomes than individualistic dyads, are found both in 
studies that manipulate orientation through direct instructions (e.g., Carnevale & 
Lawler, 1986; Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 1998; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt & 
Lewis, 1975), and in studies that manipulate situational characteristics assumed to 
affect orientation (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; 1984b; Carnevale & Isen, 1986). 
Cooperative dyads are more likely to share information, engage in more problem 
solving, and use less contentious tactics than individualistic dyads (Carnevale & 
Lawler, 1986; Lewis & Fry, 1977; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).  
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In some previous studies, the parties have known that their opponent have had 
the same orientation instruction as themselves (e.g., Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; Lewis 
& Fry, 1977; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). In other studies, the parties did not have this 
information (e.g., Giebels et al., 1998; Weingart et al., 1993), but the effects on joint 
outcomes are similar. We believe that the cooperative dyads also reach better 
agreements than the individualistic dyads when one party has information about the 
other’s orientation. Negotiators are likely to be egocentric in their social perceptions, 
and without information they have a tendency to assume that opponents are similar to 
themselves (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). With no information about the 
opponents’ orientation, negotiators may be likely to project their own orientations on 
to the opponents’ (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). Research on social value orientations 
in experimental games also indicates that negotiators typically expect consistency 
between their own and the opponents’ orientation (Iedema & Poppe, 1994; Kuhlman, 
Brown, & Tetac, 1992). 
Consequently, having the information that the other party has the same 
orientation as oneself may only contribute to confirming already established 
expectations (although these expectations may be implicit). The dynamic found in 
cooperative and individualistic dyads (with no information) may therefore be 
reinforced when there is asymmetric information. Informed cooperators contribute to 
the development of a cooperative dynamic, resulting in integrative outcomes and high 
perceived negotiation quality. Informed individualists will only increase their 
competitive drive in order to avoid being exploited by the other party. Thus, the 
conflict spiral will be escalated, and the outcomes are likely to be poor. Consequently, 
we expect the superiority of homogenous cooperative dyads over homogenous 
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individualistic dyads found in previous research (De Dreu et al., 2000), to hold also 
when there is asymmetry in information.  
Hypothesis 1: Cooperative dyads with asymmetry in information get better 
outcomes than individualistic dyads with asymmetry in 
information. 
In our research we examine two different types of mixed dyads. In some dyads 
the cooperators have the information advantage, and in other dyads the individualists 
have the information advantage. Having an information advantage implies that the 
focal party is informed about the motivational orientation of the other party, while the 
other party has no such information about the focal party. The current research is 
concerned with how the two types of mixed dyads compare to each other, and how 
they compare to the homogeneous cooperative dyads and the homogeneous 
individualistic dyads.  
The negotiation literature has seldom addressed issues related to mixed dyads 
and asymmetrical information. However, in general there is a tendency toward 
reciprocation in negotiations (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998), and thus we may expect 
mixed dyads to converge either towards competition (distributive processes) or 
towards cooperation (integrative processes). Research on experimental games 
suggests that both individualists and cooperators may shift behavior (Kuhlman & 
Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Individualists (as opposed to 
competitors) may cooperate when situational stimuli (e.g., open communication and 
reversibility of choices) allow for it (Deutsch, 1960). Similarly, cooperators may 
compete when they perceive it as the only feasible alternative (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). 
Rhoades & Carnevale (1999) state that while maintaining their original motivational 
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orientations, negotiators may choose widely among behavioral tactics to reach their 
goals.  
Cooperation Theory (Deutsch, 1994) suggests that mixed dyads are unstable. 
We believe that the evolvement of competition or cooperation in mixed dyads may be 
influenced by who has the information advantage. Let us first consider the situation 
where the cooperators are informed. The cooperators will avoid the false consensus 
belief that their opponents are also cooperators. In addition, the cooperators will 
expect more contending behavior, guard against it initially, and not yield easily. As 
the cooperators have a mandate of maximizing both own and joint outcomes, they 
may try to steer the process towards cooperation by sending signals of willingness to 
cooperate, and at the same time make it clear that they will not make one-sided 
concessions. Such mixed communication (Brett et al., 1998) may trigger cooperation 
from individualists, because they learn that the best route to high individual outcome 
is through cooperation rather than through exploitation. The individualists do not want 
harm to come to their opponents, but only to maximize their own gain. 
The dynamic in mixed dyads with informed individualists may be very 
different. The informed individualists have no incentives to help the other parties in 
the negotiation process. As they are informed about their opponents’ cooperative 
orientation, use of pressure tactics is likely to be perceived as the best way to further 
their individual goals. The dynamic of the negotiation will therefore most likely be 
dominated by contentious communication that leads to poor agreements. Thus, we 
offer the following hypotheses regarding differences in dyadic level outcomes: 
Hypothesis 2a: Mixed dyads with informed cooperators get better 
outcomes than individualistic dyads with asymmetric 
information.  
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Hypothesis 2b: Mixed dyads with informed individualists get poorer 
outcomes than cooperative dyads with asymmetric 
information. 
Hypothesis 2c: Mixed dyads with informed cooperators get better 
outcomes than mixed dyads with informed 
individualists.   
Individual Outcome 
We will now turn to how joint outcome is divided between negotiators in the 
same dyad, beginning with the homogeneous dyads. In general, we expect 
information to be an advantage in negotiations, as knowledge about the motivational 
orientation of the other party reduces uncertainty. Consequently, the informed 
negotiators can adjust their behavior to their expectations about the other parties, and 
thereby further their own goal whether it is to maximize only their own gain or also 
the gain of the other party. We must keep in mind that cooperative negotiators are 
neither altruistic nor only concerned with the dyadic level outcomes. For example, 
cooperators that have been informed about the opponents’ cooperative orientation 
may use this knowledge in the final phase of the negotiation in order to claim a larger 
part of the pie. They do not expect the demands to jeopardize a settlement, since the 
opponent is a cooperator. The informed individualists who meet uninformed 
individualists can use the information advantage to set extra high opening offers and 
concede slowly.  
Hypothesis 3: Negotiators who are informed that their opponents share their 
orientation get higher individual outcome than their uninformed 
opponents. 
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In the mixed dyads we expect agreements that favour the informed 
individualists. The uninformed cooperators will, at least initially, be considerate and 
employ integrative tactics. This put the informed individualists in a position to exploit 
the cooperative negotiators with distributive behavior. An advantage for the 
individualists can also be found in the closing phase of the negotiation. Here the 
cooperators may be willing to (unilaterally) concede in order to secure an agreement 
that may seem to be at risk. However, when the cooperators have the information 
advantage, they can guard against exploitation. In summary, we therefore propose the 
following hypothesis regarding distribution of values between negotiators in mixed 
dyads: 
Hypothesis 4: Individualists get higher individual outcomes than their 
cooperative opponents, but only when they have the 
information advantage. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 162 business students enrolled in negotiation courses served as 
subjects in this study. Their average age was 25 years, and women composed 43 
percent of the sample. The participants received a cooperative or an individualistic 
orientation, and were paired with a cooperative or an individualistic opponent. In each 
dyad, one of the parties received information about the motivational orientation of 
their opponent. The participants were randomly assigned to orientation condition, 
information condition, and role (buyer or seller), and conditions and roles were fully 
counterbalanced.  
Procedures 
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The negotiation task was a buyer-seller interaction about the delivery of 
television sets (cf. Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Three issues had to be negotiated; the date 
of delivery, product variations, and financing terms. Each issue had nine alternative 
settlement points. The total payoff-matrix is shown in table 1. We chose this 
simulation because it is a commonly used variable-sum negotiation that allows for 
integrative agreements through logrolling. The parties could achieve high quality 
agreements by exchanging concession on their low-profit issues. The negotiation was 
conducted during the first meeting of the classes. Each student was assigned the role 
of buyer or seller, and received confidential role information. The confidential role 
information contained background information, manipulation instructions, and a profit 
matrix that showed the negotiators their individual profit associated with the different 
possible alternatives. After preparing individually for 10 minutes, the participants 
were assigned to dyads (a seller and a buyer) and led to separate rooms. The dyads 
were given 30 minutes to negotiate. Following the negotiation, the participants 
completed questionnaires regarding motivational orientations, perceived negotiation 
quality, and the negotiation process. Finally, the participants were debriefed. 
Manipulations 
 Orientation. Following previous research on motivational orientation in 
negotiation (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1993), individualistic and 
cooperative orientations were manipulated through written instructions. The 
manipulations were presented as instructions from management. In the individualistic 
condition, the subjects read that their primary goal was to maximize own outcome. In 
the cooperative condition, the participants read that their primary goal was to 
maximize their own and the total outcome for the two companies. 
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 Information. In each dyad, one of the participants received information about 
the motivational orientation of the other party. The other participants received no 
information. In the information condition, the instruction about their own orientation 
was followed by information about the motivational orientation they should expect 
their opponent to have. In the case of an individualistic opponent, the participants read 
that based on the firm’s previous experience with the opponent, they could expect the 
opponent to have a goal of maximizing own outcome. In the case of a cooperative 
opponent, the participants read that based on the firm’s previous experience with the 
opponent, they could expect the opponent to have a goal of maximizing their own 
outcome and the total outcome for the two companies. 
Measures 
Individual Outcome. Individual outcome was measured as the total profit 
achieved by the negotiator across the three issues. For example, if the negotiators in a 
dyad agreed on 6-7 weeks on delivery time and on financing terms, and 5 product 
variations (see table 1), each negotiator would receive an individual outcome of 4000. 
Joint Outcome. We measured joint outcome as the sum of the individual 
outcomes achieved by the seller and the buyer in a dyad. Thus, if the negotiators 
agreed on the alternative suggested above, their joint outcome would be 8000. In fully 
integrative agreements (e.g., zero weeks on delivery time and on financing terms), the 
joint outcome was 10400. 
Perceived Quality. Perceived negotiation quality was measured by eight 
items (five-point scales). The participants were asked to indicate, individually, their 
satisfaction and perception of fairness with the negotiation process and outcome. They 
answered questions such as “How satisfied are you with the negotiation process?”, 
and “To what extent do you find the negotiation outcome to be fair?” The reliability 
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of the overall index was .80, and we used the average score across items. The index 
may either be used at the individual or the dyadic levels of analyses. If the index is to 
be used at the dyadic level, homogeneous perception in each dyad must be 
demonstrated (George, 1990). We used the within-group interrater agreement index 
(James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) to examine consensus between dyadic members. 
Agreement within a group was calculated separately for each dyad. One dyad in each 
of the mixed dyads fell below the suggested benchmark of .70 (George & 
Bettenhausen, 1990) and were not included. The average interrater agreement was 
.95, and agreement rates did not differ across compositions. This justifies the use of 
the index at the dyadic level.  
Negotiation Process. In order to be able to explore the negotiation dynamic in 
more detail, several items regarding the negotiation process were included in the post-
negotiation questionnaire. The participants were asked to indicate the extent of 
integrative activities (exchange information about interests/priorities, clear 
communication about interests, and simultaneous consideration of issues), and 
distributive activities (the use of pressure tactics to claim value, argumentation, and 
conflict about the process). The dyadic members discussed each statement about the 
process before giving their individual answers. Typically, pair members gave the 
same answers. In the very few cases of disagreement, we used the average score of 
the dyadic members to compose the dyadic measure. The participants first answered 
questions regarding the overall process, and then for each of three phases. We used 
three phases because this is often suggested in phase-approaches to negotiations, i.e. 
initiation, problem-solving, and resolution (Holmes, 1992). We asked the participants 
to rate both the total negotiation process, and phase 1, 2, and 3 of the negotiation, 
separately. The participants were told in the questionnaire that phase 1 included the 
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initial 25 percent of the time used, phase 2 the middle 50 percent of the time, and 
phase 3 the final 25 percent of the time used to negotiate. A principal component 
analysis revealed as expected an integrative factor and a distributive factor. The 
reliability coefficients were .63 and .64, respectively. They are acceptable given the 
exploratory nature of the process investigations. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Orientation. In the post-negotiation questionnaire the participants were asked 
to indicate their primary objective in the negotiation. Three alternatives were available 
(Weingart et al., 1993): (1) maximize own outcome, (2) maximize own and the total 
outcome for the two companies, and (3) other. A Chi-square analysis showed that the 
manipulation had a significant impact on the participants’ orientation, χ2 (1, N = 162) 
= 91.09, p < .0001. Subjects in the individualistic condition were more likely to 
answer alternative (1), whereas subjects in the cooperative condition were more likely 
to answer alternative (2). Our research focus on how individuals that understand, 
adopt, and keep their motivational orientation performs under different contextual 
stimuli (i.e., information condition and opponent’s motivational orientation). In the 
primary analyses, we therefore dropped the dyads where one or both members 
reported wrong motivational orientation. We did so after having found that the 
dropped participants did not differ in systematic ways from other participants, except 
for choosing an orientation different from the one given in the instruction.1  
                                                 
1 Twenty-one of the participants’ orientations were different from the ones given in the instruction. 
When we excluded these participants, and their dyads, and two dyads with an impasse, the total number 
of dyads in the primary analyses were 60 (21 cooperative, 15 individualistic, 13 mixed with informed 
cooperators, and 11 mixed with informed individualists). Secondary analyses including all participants 
showed similar result as in the primary analyses, but the effects of composition on joint outcome and 
integrative activities dropped to non-significance (F-values ≈ 1.5, p-values ≈ 0.20). Drop-out rate did 
not interact with conditions (composition and own position within composition). Neither had the 
dropped cases “weaker” orientation than other participants, as we found no differences between 
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Information. In the post-negotiation questionnaire the participants were also 
asked to indicate which expectations they had about the opponent’s orientation before 
the negotiation started. The alternatives they had to choose from were the same as in 
the orientation check above. The factual information about the orientation of the 
opponents were accurately perceived, χ2 (1, n = 60) = 20.71, p < .0001. Those 
informed about an individualistic opponent were more likely to expect an 
individualistic opponent, while those informed about a cooperative opponent were 
more likely to expect a cooperative opponent.2 
Dyadic Outcomes 
We first compared the joint outcomes in the four dyadic compositions. Means 
and standard deviations across the compositions are shown in table 2. Composition 
had a significant effect on joint outcome, F (1, 56) = 4.33, p < .01. The cooperative 
dyads (M = 9543) and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators (M = 9823) got the 
highest joint outcomes, while the individualistic dyads (M = 9040) and the mixed 
dyads with informed individualists (M = 9036) reached the lowest joint outcomes. 
Planned pair comparisons showed that both the two former compositions differed 
significantly from both of the two latter (p-values ≤ .05). Second, we compared 
perceived negotiation quality in the four compositions (see table 2). Composition also 
had a significant impact on the perceived quality, F (1, 54) = 4.24, p < .01. The 
cooperative dyads (M = 3.83) and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators (M = 
3.88) had higher perceived quality than the individualistic dyads (M = 3.53) and the 
                                                                                                                                            
participants with correct and wrong orientation on a question measuring the degree to which the 
participants tried to fulfil their primary objective.  
 
2 Thirteen participants did not report the correct orientation of their opponent. Most of them were those 
informed about a cooperative opponent. In each condition, we compared these dyads with the other 
dyads, and found no differences. Analyses showed that the results were almost exactly the same 
whether the dyads of these members were included or not. We therefore included these dyads in the 
primary analyses. 
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mixed dyads with informed individualists (M = 3.53). Again, the planned pair 
comparisons showed significant differences where both the two former compositions 
differed from both of the two latter (p-values ≤ .05).  
The results support our dyadic level hypotheses. With asymmetry in 
information, the cooperative dyads reach higher outcomes than the individualistic 
dyads (Hypothesis 1). The mixed dyads with informed cooperators reach higher 
outcomes than the individualistic dyads (Hypothesis 2a), the mixed dyads with 
informed individualists reach lower outcomes than the cooperative dyads (Hypothesis 
2b), and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators reach higher outcomes than the 
mixed dyads with informed individualists (Hypothesis 2c). These results hold for both 
joint outcome and perceived negotiation quality. 
Negotiation Process 
 We examined the negotiation process in order to explore the micro-mediating 
process between dyadic compositions and outcomes. First, we examined how the 
composition affected the integrative and the distributive activities, respectively. 
Means and standard deviations for the overall process across compositions are shown 
in the bottom half of table 2. Composition had a marginally significant impact on the 
integrative negotiation activities, F (1, 56) = 2.33, p = .08. The cooperative dyads (M 
= 3.72) and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators (M = 3.72) had more 
integrative negotiation activities than did both the individualistic dyads (M = 3.27) 
and the mixed dyads with informed individualists (M = 3.24). Composition had a 
significant effect on the distributive negotiation activities, F (1, 56) = 3.55, p < .05. 
The individualistic dyads had the highest level of distributive negotiation activities (M 
= 3.32), followed by the mixed dyads with informed cooperators (M = 3.00), the 
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mixed dyads with informed individualists (M = 2.74), and the cooperative dyads (M = 
2.68). 
In order to explore the negotiation process further, we conducted additional 
analyses of variance where the integrative and distributive activities in each of the 
three phases were examined. The dynamics are illustrated in figures 1 and 2, 
respectively. For the integrative activities (see figure 1), the overall 4 (compositions) 
X 3 (phases) model was significant, F (11, 166) = 3.79, p < .001. The main effects for 
both composition and phase were significant, while the interaction effect failed to 
reach significance. In addition to confirming the previous reported effects of 
composition, the analysis shows that integrative activities vary across phases. The 
integrative activities increase gradually over time and reach their highest level in the 
third and final stage. An inspection of figure 1 indicates that the differences in 
integrative activities between the cooperative dyads/dyads with informed cooperators 
and individualistic dyads/dyads with informed individualists are small in the initial 
phase and large in the final phase. For the distributive activities (see figure 2), the 
overall 4 (compositions) X 3 (phases) ANOVA was also significant, F (11, 168) = 
2.88, p < .01. The main effect for composition was significant. The main effect for 
phase was marginally significant, and the interaction effect failed to reach 
significance. The distributive activities are, as shown in figure 2, highest in the middle 
phase of the negotiation. 
The effects of process on the dyadic outcomes are presented in table 3. When 
the overall measures of integrative activities and distributive activities are used in 
regression analyses, process has a significant impact both on the joint outcome (R2 = 
.18, p < .01) and on the perceived negotiation quality (R2 = .25, p < .001). High level 
of integrative activities led to high joint outcome and high perceived negotiation 
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quality. Distributive activities did not impact outcomes significantly. When we 
analysed each phase separately, we found that integrative activities are more 
important in the latter rather than in the earlier phases of negotiation. Regarding 
distributive negotiation activities, we found that high level in the final phase led to 
low perceived negotiation quality. Finally, we also examined whether the relationship 
between the process and joint outcome varied across compositions, but found no 
differences. 
Individual Outcome 
In each composition we compared individual outcome for the informed party 
with that of the uninformed opponent. A high intraclass correlation (-0.49) between 
these scores made comparison by analysis of variance inappropriate. A high negative 
intraclass correlation (Kenny & La Voie, 1985) indicates that a high individual 
outcome for one member goes along with low individual outcome for the other 
member. The observations are thus not independent of each other, and the results 
from the analysis of variance are questionable (Hoyle & Crawford, 1994). We 
therefore conducted difference analyses by subtracting, in each dyad, the individual 
score of the uninformed member from the score of the informed member. By using 
difference analyses the dependence problem is avoided, however at the cost of 
reducing the degrees of freedom. 
Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for the individual outcome 
across conditions. We first examined how the information asymmetry affected 
individual outcome in homogeneous dyads (cooperative and individualistic dyads, 
respectively). A one-sample t-test with a test-value of zero showed no significant 
differences between the informed and the uninformed negotiators, neither in the 
cooperative dyads, t (20) = 0.20, ns, nor in the individualistic dyads, t (14) = 0.12, ns. 
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However, in the mixed dyads with informed individualists, individualists got 
substantial higher individual outcome (M = 5318) than what their cooperative 
opponents achieved (M = 3718). Thus, the individualists obtained almost 60 percent 
of the total pie. A difference analysis showed this difference to be significant, t (10) = 
3.71, p < .01. In the mixed dyads with informed cooperators, the individualists also 
achieved higher individual outcomes (M = 5277) than their cooperative opponents (M 
= 4546), but this difference was not significant, t (12) = -1.64, ns.  
The results do not support Hypothesis 3 which suggested an information 
advantage in homogeneous dyads. However, the results support our Hypothesis 4 
which stated that individualists will reach higher individual outcomes than what their 
cooperative opponents achieve, but only when they have the information advantage. 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to examine the effects of motivational orientation on 
outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Instability was created by having mixed 
dyads where cooperators negotiated with individualists, and by giving only one 
member in each dyad information about the motivational orientation of the opponent.  
At the dyadic level of analysis the results appear to be quite clear. The 
cooperative dyads did better than the individualistic dyads. This confirms previous 
research (De Dreu et al., 2000), and indicates that asymmetrical information do not 
change the cooperative dyads’ superiority over individualistic dyads. The most 
interesting findings are related to the mixed dyads. When the cooperators had an 
information advantage, the mixed dyads did as well as the cooperative dyads. When 
the individualists had the information advantage, the mixed dyads did as badly as the 
individualistic dyads.  
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Our explorative process examination indicates that the cooperative dyads and 
the mixed dyads with informed cooperators also are similar to each other with regard 
to negotiation dynamics. The individualistic dyads and the mixed dyads with 
informed individualists are also similar to each other and different from the others. 
Thus, mixed dyads seem to converge towards cooperation or competition depending 
upon who has the information advantage. It is worth noting that the major differences 
seem to be related to integrative activities in the later phases of the negotiations. The 
cooperative dyads and the mixed dyads with informed cooperators increased the 
integrative activities over time, the other dyads did not. Thus, it is not the initial 
integrative activities or the distributive activities that distinguishes between the 
different dyadic compositions. 
It seems that the informed cooperators in mixed dyads are able to guard 
against exploitation, and that the individualists must participate in integrative 
activities in order to increase own gain. In the mixed dyads with informed 
individualists, the individualists seem to increase own gain by exploiting the 
cooperators. This is confirmed by our individual level analyses. We only found 
unbalanced distribution of values in the mixed dyads with informed individualists. 
Here the individualists exploited the naive cooperators. 
Implications 
The findings in this study have several implications regarding the effects of 
motivational orientation. Previous research has found motivational orientation to 
affect negotiation processes and outcomes in predictable ways when we have stable 
negotiation contexts. The present study shows that motivational orientation also 
influence outcomes in unstable negotiation contexts. Mixed dyads are not doomed to 
distributive processes and outcomes. They may in fact under some circumstances 
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create an integrative dynamic that results in high quality agreements. The 
circumstance that facilitated for cooperation in this study was the information 
advantage of the cooperators. When the individualists had an information advantage, 
the mixed dyads became similar to homogeneous individualistic dyads. Future 
research should on a broader base investigate factors that drive mixed dyads toward 
either cooperation or conflict. 
The results show the importance of having information about the opponent’s 
orientation. The potential importance of knowing the opponent’s orientation has been 
pointed out earlier; as such knowledge may affect trust in the negotiation (Kimmel, 
Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980). However, this earlier study 
did not investigate the effects of asymmetrical information. Our study shows that 
asymmetrical information may have a substantial effect on the process and 
performance, not in homogeneous dyads, but in mixed dyads. An obvious avenue for 
further research is thus to examine fully informed dyads. This will give more 
comprehensive knowledge of the complex relationships between information and 
orientation that have been detected in this study. 
We included a perceptual measure of negotiation quality in this study. Given 
the importance of perception for the aftermath of negotiations, it is important to know 
if perceptual and objective measures of outcomes are positively interrelated. After 
negotiations, participants will not always in detail know the objective quality of their 
agreements. Negotiators must then rely on perceptual indicators of quality. In addition 
to substitute for objective indicators of quality, perceived negotiation quality is 
important because it may influence the implementation of negotiated agreements and 
also future negotiations between the parties. In our study, perceived negotiation 
quality was positively related to joint outcome, and had the same causes. This result 
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suggests that negotiators may trust their perceptions when evaluating negotiations. 
Future studies should, however, use more fine-grained measures of perceived 
negotiation quality. They should also use other negotiation tasks than the relatively 
simple simulation used here. 
Our results regarding the negotiation phases support the importance of 
examining processes over time (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996). Interestingly, in 
our study orientation and information did not affect the initial negotiation phase, but 
were influential in the final phase. This result is in harmony with De Dreu & Van 
Lange (1995). They found no differences in demands and concessions between 
cooperators and individualists in the first two rounds of a negotiation simulation, but 
found that differences developed over time. Thus, further research should explore 
whether in fact the critical impact of orientations comes in the later phases of 
negotiations, rather than in the early ones. 
The results from the process analyses suggest that it is more important to get 
an increase in integrative activities over time, rather than to hinder distributive 
activities. Distributive activities only had a weak negative effect on the outcomes, 
while integrative activities had a considerable positive effect on both joint outcome 
and perceived negotiation quality. Further studies should, however, investigate which 
factors that contribute to integrative activities and which factors that reduce the 
likelihood of distributive activities in negotiations. The factors may not be the same, 
and knowledge about them may have interesting implications for advicing negotiators 
on how to manage the negotiation process. 
The limitations of this study should also have implications for future research. 
For example, the study should be replicated on different samples and in different 
negotiation situations, as using students in controlled settings have its limitations. In 
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addition, upcoming studies should manipulate the orientation and information in 
different ways in order to see whether the results depend upon how the orientation is 
induced. Furthermore, in our study, the manipulation check for motivational 
orientation was conducted immediately after the negotiation. This may cause the 
process and outcome to influence the responses to the manipulation check. The results 
must be evaluated with this limitation in mind. Our purpose was, however, to examine 
the effects of motivational orientations among individuals that kept their motivational 
orientation throughout the negotiations. Future studies are needed to examine the 
conditions under which negotiators change their orientations over time.  
We also suggest the negotiation process to be examined in more detail (cf. 
Olekalns & Smith, 1999). In our exploratory analyses on process we used subjective 
and retrospective data to capture integrative and distributive activities. Perceptual data 
may, however, inaccurately reflect actual behavior. It is therefore preferable to code 
transcripts from the negotiations, based on well developed coding schemes and 
procedures. Although our study is parsimonious in its dynamic analyses, it is based on 
relatively broad measures and on perceptual rather than objective data about the 
negotiation process.  
Finally, the present research has potential practical implications. The most 
salient implication is for the naive cooperators. The uninformed cooperators meeting 
informed individualists face the risk of being exploited. Thus having a reputation of 
having a cooperative orientation may be a two-edged sword. The cooperators must 
safeguard themselves against exploitation by actively trying to acquire knowledge 
about the opponents’ goals both before and during the initial phase of negotiations. 
This can be achieved through consultations with people familiar with the other party, 
and through active listening in the negotiation (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). We do, 
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however, not recommend that negotiators try to take advantage of their cooperative 
counterparts. Admittedly, informed individualists get more value than their naive 
cooperative counterparts. But they only end up getting a large share of a small pie. 
Conclusion 
This study confirms that motivational orientation is important for negotiation behavior 
and outcome (De Dreu et al., 2000). Furthermore, it extends on previous research by 
focusing on the effects of motivational orientations in unstable negotiation contexts. 
Given the increased heterogeneity in organizations and in business transactions, 
negotiators are likely to differ in motivational orientation and in knowledge about 
their opponents’ orientation. The main conclusion from this study is that the interplay 
of these variables may be quite complex. The good news is that mixed oriented dyads 
can develop integrative processes and achieve high joint gain. The bad news is that 
naive cooperators may easily get exploited.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Payoff Matrixes for Buyer and Seller 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
           Delivery time         Product variations       Financing terms 
Alternative   Buyer    Seller    Alternative  Buyer    Seller     Alternative  Buyer  Seller 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
0 weeks   4000     0        9       2400  0   24 weeks    1600       0 
1 week   3500   200        8       2100        300   18 weeks    1400     500 
2-3 weeks   3000   400        7       1800        600   12 weeks    1200    1000 
4-5 weeks   2500   600        6       1500        900    8 weeks     1000    1500 
6-7 weeks   2000   800        5       1200       1200    6-7 weeks    800    2000 
8-9 weeks   1500  1000        4        900        1500    4-5 weeks    600    2500 
10-11 weeks   1000  1200        3          600        1800    2-3 weeks    400    3000 
12-13 weeks     500  1400        2        300        2100    1 week         200    3500 
14 weeks       0  1600        1             0         2400    0 weeks   0     4000 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Negotiators were only shown their own payoff matrix and were not allowed to 
exchange payoff matrixes. 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Dyadic Outcomes and Process across 
Compositions 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variables     CC   CI    IC          II 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Joint outcome      M  9543a  9823a             9036b           9040b 
       SD   767   377    923             565 
Perceived quality     M  3.83a  3.88a              3.53b            3.53b 
       SD  0.33  0.30   0.25            0.40 
Integrative activities     M  3.72a  3.72a   3.24b            3.27b 
       SD  0.58  0.72   0.70            0.74 
Distributive activities     M  2.68a  3.00ab   2.74a            3.32b 
       SD  0.67  0.41   0.69            0.63 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: CC = Cooperative dyads with asymmetric information, CI = Mixed dyads with 
informed cooperators, IC = Mixed dyads with informed individualists, and II = 
Individualistic dyads with asymmetric information. 
Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p ≤ .05 for joint outcome, 
perceived quality, and distributive activities, and at p ≤ .10 for integrative activities. 
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Table 3 
Regression Analyses: Negotiation Process on Dyadic Outcomes 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                    Integrative        Distributive      
Dependent Variables             Activities Activities   R2   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Joint outcome     Overall  .39**  -.16  .18**  
      Phase 1  .12  -.11  .02 
      Phase 2  .35**  -.17  .14* 
      Phase 3  .38*  -.08  .15* 
Perceived quality    Overall  .50***  -.04  .25*** 
      Phase 1  .26*   .06  .08 
      Phase 2  .46***  -.18  .22*** 
      Phase 3  .44***  -.25*  .25***  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for Individual Outcome across Conditions 
______________________________________________________________________ 
                   Informed Party      Uninformed Party 
Composition               M       SD    M         SD 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Cooperative dyads (CC)      4800      683  4743   808 
Individualistic dyads (II)      4540      696  4500   709 
Mixed dyads, individualist informed (IC)    5318a     922  3718b   773  
Mixed dyads, cooperator informed (CI)    4546      840  5277   809 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p ≤ .05.  
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Figure 1 
Effects of Dyadic Composition on Integrative Activities  
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Note: CC = Cooperative dyads with asymmetric information, CI = Mixed 
dyads with informed cooperators, IC = Mixed dyads with informed 
individualists, and II = Individualistic dyads with asymmetric information. 
 * p < .05. 
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Figure 2 
Effects of Dyadic Composition on Distributive Activities  
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Note: CC = Cooperative dyads with asymmetric information, CI = Mixed 
dyads with informed cooperators, IC = Mixed dyads with informed 
individualists, and II = Individualistic dyads with asymmetric information. 
 * p < .05. 
 
